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Past Reflections, Future Insights: African
Asylum Law and Policy in Historical
Perspective
EDWIN ODHIAMBO ABUYA*
Asiyesikia la nkuu huvunjika guu.'
Abstract
This article argues that an understanding of the evolution of asylum is an essential ingre-
dient in the search for ideas and perspectives to the plight facing forced migrants. Using
Kenya as a case study, the paper evaluates the extent to which procedures used to deter-
mine claims for asylum, protection outcomes and entitlements met international human
rights and refugee law standards. It is contended that limited resources, porous boundaries
and the mass movement of asylum seekers have compromised the level of protection
offered to those who seek surrogate protection in African states like Kenya. In conclusion,
critics in the area of asylum are challenged to undertake historical studies, as a way towards
offering best practise lessons for those involved in the protection of persons forced to flee
their home states.
1. Introduction
Since the adoption of the 1951 United Nations ('UN') Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees 2 ('Refugee Convention'), and its regional
counterpart, the African Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa 3 ('OAU Refugee Convention'), empirical and
* Dr. Edwin Odhiambo Abuya, Law Lecturer at the School of Law, Moi Univesity, Kenya and
Advocate of the High Court of Kenya (edwinabuya@yahoo.co.uk). This article was completed when
the author was at the TransitionalJustice Institute, University of Ulster, UK. The author is thankful to
Terri Drage, Joseph Mwaura ('Ivor'), Henry Mutai and the reviewers of this journal for their useful
comments on earlier drafts of this piece, as well as participants in the Socio-Legal Studies Association
Conference (Legal History Stream), held at the University of Stirling, UK, in March 2006, for their
valuable input. Thanks are also due to Salaton Leteipan for providing data on United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees ('UNHCR') operations in Kenya. Special thanks are given to the living
God for His endless protection. This article is dedicated to the author's family, the Abuyas,
who taught him the value of hard work and commitment.
I Swahili adage: A person who disregards an elder's advice ends up breaking his or her leg' (Author's
translation).
2 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees ('Refugee Convention'), 28July 1951, 189 UNTS
137, entered into force 22 Apr. 1954.
3 African Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee problems in Africa ('OAU Refu-
gee Convention'), adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its Sixth Ordinary
Session (Addis Ababa, 10 Sept. 1969), entered into force 20June 1974.
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theoretical studies have produced a wide range of literature on various
aspects of refugee protection. Commentators in the area of forced migra-
tion have contributed immensely to the current store of information.
Generally speaking, literature in this area has been largely based on issues
such as: definition of terms such as 'refugee', protection and asylum;4 role
of institutions like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
('UNHCR'), and its ability to meet its mandate; 5 refugee entitlements and
duties in host states;6 detention of asylum seekers; 7 durable solutions for
refugees;8 and, more recently, the impact of 9/11 on asylum.9
A survey of these accounts, however, shows that the history of asylum at
a national level remains an under-researched area. Current writings have
focussed mainly on the evolution of the international refugee protection
regime.' 0 Whilst some studies have been conducted on Africa, 1 1 despite the
continent generating and playing host to a vast number of 'people of con-
cern', 12 specific country accounts are rare. The objective of this article is
not to address the evolution of Africa's formal refugee protection scheme -
that is the subject of a separate article(s). Rather, using Kenya as a
case study, this article aims to plug the literature gap on specific country
experiences.
4 Atle Grahl-Madsen, 'Identifying the World's Refugees', (1983) 467 Annals of theAmerican Academy
11; Louise Holborn, Refugees: A Problem of Our Tune (New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1975) chapters
7-11.
5 Sadako Ogata, 'The Evolution of UNHCR', (1994) 47 Journal of International Affairs 419; Astri
Suhrke and Kathleen Newland, 'UNHCR: Uphill in the Future', (2001) 35 International Migration Review
284.
6 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005) chapters 4-6; Johanna Schiratzki, 'The Best Interest of the Child in the Swedish Aliens
Act', (2000) 14 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 206.
7 Alison Bashford and Carolyn Strange, Asylum-Seekers and National Histories of Detention',
(2002) 48 Australian Journal of Politics and History 509; Galina Cornelisse, 'Human Rights for Immigra-
tion Detainees in Strasbourg: Limited Sovereignty or a Limited Discourse?', (2004) 6 European Journal
of Immigration and the Law 93.
8 C.R. Nagel, 'Geopolitics by Another Name: Immigration and the Politics of Assimilation', (2002)
21 Political Geography 971; Kallu Kalumiya, Angola: A Model Repatriation Programme?' (2004) 23 RSQ
205; Cindy Horst, 'Buis Amongst Somalis in Dadaab: The Transnational and Historical Logics
Behind Resettlement Dreams', (2006) 19JTRS 143.
9 Savitri Taylor, 'Reconciling Australia's International Protection Obligations with the War on Ter-
rorism', (2002) 14 Pacfica Review 121; Carl Levy, 'The European Union After 9/11: The Demise of a
Liberal Democratic Asylum Regime?', (2005) Government and Opposition 26; Regina Germain, 'Rushing
to Judgement: The Unintended Consequences of the USA PATRIOT Act for Bona Fide Refugees',
(2002) 16 Georgetown Immlgration Law Journal 505.
10 Frank Krenz, 'The Refugee as a Subject of International Law', (1966) 15 ICLQ89; Yewdall Yen-
nings, 'Some International Law Aspects of the Refugee Question', (1939) 29 British YearBook of Interna-
tional Law 98.
'1 Paul Weis, 'The Convention of the Organisation of African Unity Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa', (1970) 3 Revue des Droits deL'homme 449.
12 As of 1 Jan. 2006, Africa was host to some 5.2 million (25%) 'persons of concern' to UNHCR.
See UNHCR, '2005 Global Refugee Trends: Statistical Overview of Populations of Refugees, Asy-
lum-Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons, Stateless Persons, and Other Persons of Concern to
UNHCR', available on the UNHCR website at http://www.unhcr.ch (visited 28 Nov. 2006), 104.
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What contribution could analysis of the evolution of refugee protection
within any particular setting make? Primarily, history gives a reader a per-
spective on the social and political context from which the concept of refu-
gee protection within a specific setting developed. A historical account can
also enable one to appreciate the current challenges facing asylum regimes.
Moreover, a historical analysis can provide insights into measures that
might be taken to meet the plight of those seeking asylum as refugees.
Put simply, the lessons of history serve to remind us from where we came
and of the road ahead, as well as the possible consequences of the mea-
sures taken.
Historians affirm this view. Eric Hobsbawm, for example, emphasizes
that history 'can help us understand what [the] problems [of humanity]
are, and what their conditions for their solution must be ... '.13 While,
according to John Tosh, in an analysis on 'the uses of history', a study of
past events 'provides a much-needed perspective on some of the pressing
problems of our time'. 14 Law academics have also underpinned the impor-
tance of legal history. In his discussion of the development of Australian
drug laws, Terry Carney contends that 'contemporary ... strategies ought
not to be formulated without first considering the historical record'.1 5
A.WB. Simpson similarly notes that 'it hardly makes sense to study law
without first paying some attention' to the past. ' 6
In the asylum context in particular, Charles Westin maintains that 'one
cannot really discuss the trends in refugee policy that apply in the African
situation without saying something about the historical ... context'. 17 Liza
Schuster, in an article that examines historical lessons in the context of
asylum, writes that 'taking a long term perspective on asylum allows us to
place developments in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries in a wider
context .... [This approach] also shows the different benefits - material
and ideal - that asylum has conferred on the different asylum-granting
bodies'. 18 Failure to consider lessons of history, as Gervase Coles, former
Assistant Legal Adviser of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs,
warns, may lead to a 'consequential risk of seeing the refugee problem
13 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991 (London: Michael
Joseph, 1994), 583.
14 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History: Aims Methods, and New Directions in the Study of Modern History
(London: Longman, 2002), 52.
15 Terry Carney, 'The History of Australian Drug Laws: Commercialism to Confusion?', (1980-
1981) 7Monash University Law Review 165, 171.
16 A.WB. Simpson, 'Legal Education and Legal History', (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
106, 109-110.
17 Charles Westin, 'Regional Analysis of Refugee Movements: Origins and Response', in Alastair
Ager, (ed.), Refugees: Perspectises on the Eperience of Forced Miration (London: Biddies, 1999) 24-45, 25.
18 Liza Schuster, Asylum and the Lessons of History', (2002) 44 Race and Class 40, 41.
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from an inadequate and even distorted perspective'. 19 This article seeks
to respond to the advice given by these commentators by evaluating the
evolution of the refugee protection system in post-independent Kenya.20
Kenya is chosen as an example of an African state for a number of
fundamental reasons. Primarily, as the legislative history of the OAU
Refugee Convention suggests, Kenya was one of the few states involved
in the search for a regional solution for the hundreds of thousands of
refugees then scattered over Africa after the wars of independence, which
occurred mostly between 1955 and 1965. In addition, the country has
had a long experience of refugees and asylum seekers dating back to the
1960s. 21 Furthermore, owing to political stability and relative calm,
Kenya has over the years hosted forced migrants from other African
states.22 As of 2 June 2006, it was host to some 270,000 persons of
concern from at least eight neighbouring states.23 Lastly, UNHCR, the
international guardian of refugees, 24 has maintained a field presence in
Kenya since 1969.
Two additional points must also be emphasized. Firstly, although this
article focuses on one jurisdiction, its findings have potential to apply
broadly because African countries share similar challenges when dealing
with forced migrants. Secondly, the analysis in this article is limited to the
period dating from 1963, when Kenya attained independence, to 1992.
Until 1991 the refugee mandate was placed on the Government. As we
shall later see, from 1992 Kenya abrogated its refugee obligations to the
UNHCR. By the end of 2006, the UNHCR was still in charge of the
entire asylum system. The only meaningful contribution from the Kenyan
government being the provision of physical space, albeit in the more
remote parts of the country, which the UNHCR uses to construct camps
to house refugees and asylum seekers. All other forms of material assist-
ance are provided by the UNHCR.
19 Gervase Coles, 'The Basis and Function of Refugee Law', in Institute of Public International
Law and International Relations of Thessaloniki (ed.), Refigee Problem on Universal, Regional andNational
Level, Vol. XIII, (Institute of Public International Law and International Relations: Thessaloniki, 1987)
655, 666.
20 For an analysis of refugee protection in colonial Kenya, see David Wilkin, 'Refugees and British
Administrative Policy in Northern Kenya, 1936-1938', (1980) African Affairs 510.
21 See Tala Skari and Edward Girardet, 'Urban Refugees: Out of the Public Eye' (1985) 23 Refugees
14, describing a 'self-reliance' project which was begun by a group of five Mozambican asylum seekers
and their families near Nairobi who arrived in Kenya in the late 1960s, 16.
22 Namely: Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Rwanda.
23 Namely: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan
and Uganda. See UNHCR, above, n. 12.
24 Art. I of the Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
('UNHCR Statute'), adopted by General Assembly resolution 428 (V) of 14 Dec. 1950, sets out the
UNHCR mandate as providing 'international protection' to refugees. Note, however, that states hold
the principal responsibility for ensuring protection of refugees.
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Like Kenya, the UNHCR has assumed the refugee mandate in many
African states.25 However, recently there has been increasing pressure on
African states to pass domestic legislation that would provide effective sur-
rogate protection to victims of armed conflict and persecution. Under this
arrangement the UNHCR's role would be that of a watchdog, as was orig-
inally designed. Governments, meanwhile, would take up more respons-
ibility relating to refugee governance. Accordingly, as Kenya braces itself
(albeit slowly)26 to resume its role as the primary protector of forced
migrants coming to its territory, it remains important to evaluate lessons of
history. As a way forward, it is crucial to analyse the historical record, par-
ticularly from when the Government took an active part in the manage-
ment of refugees and asylum seekers. In addition to explaining past
challenges, the historical method and case study approach also provides
insights on how to resolve current dilemmas. The discussion in this paper
will also facilitate an analysis of refugee protection that is based on more
than mere speculation. Overall, Kenya offers an opportunity for a histori-
cal study into asylum law and policy in Africa, and a unique locus to draw
wide-reaching conclusions. Its experience will be of value to other African
states that are moving towards assuming their protection obligations. 2 7
This article focuses on the administrative procedures established by
Nairobi to assess claims and the nature of protection that was offered to
those admitted as refugees. Discussed are three key aspects of any refugee
protection system. The first aspect concerns the criteria used for recognis-
ing refugees. The second point of interest relates to the mode of assessing
asylum claims, and the last deals with the nature of protection which was
offered to those who were granted refugee status. Section two provides
an overview of the movements of forced migrants into Kenya during the
period of focus. In sections three, four and five Kenya's early refugee
protection system is evaluated. Initially, the protection regime had two
aspects to it - a legislative structure and a practical scheme. Each will be
considered in turn. Comparing and contrasting the legal and actual asylum
schemes, sections three and four demonstrate that these two systems were
at odds. However, under both systems, claimants were required to prove
that they were persons to whom Kenya owed protection obligations.
The protection outcomes and entitlements granted to those who sat-
isfied the 'refugee' criteria are evaluated in section five. This section
also looks at the extent to which the asylum regime met international
25 See UNHCR, above n. 12, 46-50.
26 The drafting process of Kenya's domestic asylum legislation has been ongoing since the early
1990s.
27 Two African states that have passed domestic refugee-specific legislation are South Africa,
Refugees Act 1998, and Tanzania, Refugees Act 1998.
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standards,28 particularly those relating to employment, travel, family unity
and reunification, health and education needs. It is argued that, although
significant steps were made to meet international norms, the rising refugee
population together with finite resources and limited opportunities in the
local job market drastically affected these measures. This starting point
allows this article to anchor its analysis by examining different basic frame-
works for a refugee protection system. The analysis also highlights key
features of the legal and policy frameworks, which is a necessary preced-
ent to considering how they are applied.
Section six examines some of the reasons that may account for the col-
lapse of the Government's refugee protection regime. Section seven reflects
on some of the lessons learnt from history In conclusion, section eight
offers some recommendations that may go towards finding solutions to the
plight facing the millions who have been forced to seek shelter as refugees.
2. Forced migrants into Kenya: the reception discourse
After almost 75 years under British rule, Kenya gained its independence
on 12 December 1963. Historically, the flow of asylum seekers into Kenya
began in the late 1960s. It gathered momentum in the early 1970s owing
to political events in Uganda during the reign of the late President Idi
Amin. Amin's brutal regime murdered tens of thousands of people in
Uganda. In addition, several thousand Asians 29 and Africans 30 were
expelled, or fled, seeking sanctuary in Kenya and other neighbouring
states for political and/or economic reasons. These groups were typical
of African refugees in terms of the classification of Simon Smith and
Joseph Donders:
Nearly all African refugees are either political or economic refugees. The political
refugees are in fear of persecution due to differences in political beliefs between
them and the leaders of their countries of origin. The economic refugees, fleeing
28 These standards are set by the following treaties, which codify human rights norms: Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), UNGA Res 217 A, GAOR, 3d Sess., 183 plen. Mtg., art 22
UN Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ('ICCPR'),
GA Res. 2200(XXI) UN GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS
171, entered into force 23 Mar. 1976; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights ('ICESCR'), adopted by UN Gen Ass. on 16 Dec. 1966, 999 UNTS (entered into force 3Jan.
1976); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child ('CRC'), GA Res. 44/25 of 20 Nov. 1989, 1577
UNTS 3 (entry into force 2 Sept. 1990).
29 In Aug. 1972, Amin gave Asians an ultimatum to leave Uganda within three months. Although
Britain admitted most of them, some 6,000 Asians are said to have sought shelter in Kenya. Source of
data: Letter dated 30 Mar. 1973 from PR.N. Fifoot, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to A.B.
McNulty, Secretary to the European Commission of Human Rights Council of Europe. See Records
of.the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 'Expulsion of United Kingdom Citizens of Asian Origin
from Countries in East Africa' (FCO 31/1443 Folio 76).
30 Henry Kyemba, State of Blood: The Inside Story of Idi Amin's Reign of Fear (London: Paddington
Press, 1977) chapter 9;Jimmy Tindigarukayo, 'Uganda, 1979-85: Leadership in Transition', (1988) 26
The Journal of Modern Afiican Studies 607, 613.
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their countries because of the lack of food or money to buy it, are often very badly
off because of the political strife of their home regions and mother countries.31
Because the number of Ugandan refugees was relatively low and most
had relatives in Kenya, the forced migrants were easily accepted into
Kenyan society. Once they had crossed into the country, the Ugandans
settled themselves among local populations in urban and rural areas.
Unfortunately, President Amin's removal from power in 1979 did not
put an end to the exodus from Uganda. In fact, President Milton Obote's
rule, from 1980 to 1985, displaced even more people than that of Idi Amin.
Comparing the two regimes, Abdu Kasozi writes that, whereas under
Amin violence 'was like a tide, peaking and subsiding at certain periods',
under Obote it was 'always at high tide'. 32 It was not until 1986, when
President Yoweri Museveni took effective control of the country by mili-
tary coup that the exodus from Uganda into Kenya decreased significantly
Many Ugandan refugees began returning home. This might explain the
reason why, between 1985 and 1986, Kenya's refugee population fell by
at least two thousand, as figure 1 (below) shows.
Notwithstanding the restoration of peace and stability in Uganda and
the subsequent return of refugees to the country, the statistics show that
Kenya's refugee population continued to rise gradually in succeeding years.
Between 1986 and 1990 it had doubled. The rise in numbers occurred
for many reasons: there was internal war and civil strife in neighbouring
states, especially Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, as well as a severe drought





1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Years
Figure 1. Number of Refugees in Kenya, 1980-199033
31 Simon Smith and Joseph Donders, Refugees Are People: An Action Report on the Refugees in Africa
(Eldoret: Gaba, 1985), 4.
32 Abdu Kasozi, The Origi of Vwlence in Uganda, 1964 - 1985 (London: McGill University Press,
1994), 145. He describes Obote's regime as a 'terror machine', 147.
33 Data from UNHCR.
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3. The legislative structure: international and
domestic frameworks
3.1 Application of international refugee law in Kenya
At independence, Kenya adopted the British approach to international
law and the adoption of treaties. As a dualist state, when the Govern-
ment ratified the Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees 34 ('Refugee Protocol'), on 16 May 1966 and
13 November 1981, respectively, this action per se did not create any
rights, duties or obligations on the domestic plane. In Kenya treaties do
not apply unless Parliament passes domestic legislation, or amends exist-
ing legislation, to incorporate their provisions. Put in another way, the
fact that Kenya is a party to a treaty does not of itself create private
rights and obligations enforceable by action brought in a Kenyan court.
This position is affirmed by the Judicature Act 1967, which excludes
treaties as a source 'of law' in Kenya. 35 At most, ratification of the
refugee treaties was a show of commitment to the international com-
munity that Nairobi essentially agreed with the provisions stipulated by
these instruments.
This principle has its foundation in the proposition that, in Kenya's con-
stitutional system, the making and ratification of treaties falls within the
province of the Executive, 36 whereas the making and the alteration of the
law are parliamentary functions.3 7 The East African Court of Appeal 38
underlined in East African Community v. Republic:39
The provisions of a treaty entered into by the Government of Kenya do not
become part of the municipal law of Kenya save in so far as they are made such
by the law of Kenya.4
0
However, once a treaty is incorporated into the domestic legal frame
work the transforming legislation ranks at par and applies in the same
way as other pieces of legislation.
34 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ('Refugee Protocol'), 31 Jan. 1967, 606 UNTS 267
(entered into force 4 Oct. 1967).
35 Section 3(1) of this legislation lists the following 'sources of law': Acts of Parliament, the Consti-
tution, Common Law, Doctrines of Equity and Statutes of general application in force in England as
at 12 Aug. 1897, and African Customary Law.
36 Constitution of Kenya, section 23.
37 Ibid., sections 30 and 46.
38 The East African Court of Appeal was precursor to the Kenyan Court of Appeal, the highest
court in Kenya (P Newbold, V.R Duffus,J.A. Spry)'.
39 (1970) EA 457.
40 Ibid., 460.




3.2 Domestic legal framework: the Immigration Act (1967)
and the Aliens Restriction Act (1973)
The 1973 Aliens Restriction Act4 1 and the Immigration Act of 196742
were the two enactments most relevant to the protection of refugees and
asylum seekers in Kenya. While neither incorporated precisely the terms
of the Refugee Convention and Refugee Protocol, key elements of these
treaties were recognised and incorporated into Kenyan law by reference.
The two pieces of legislation shared two common features. Both were
shaped by the exodus of Ugandans into Kenya during Amin's reign. The
Immigration Act, for instance, was amended to provide for forced migra-
tion, as well as (orderly) immigration. The Aliens Restriction Act was
passed to govern non-citizens and 'aliens', including refugees, also in di-
rect response to the Ugandan exodus. The second common feature of
these Acts is that both had a dual purpose. The preamble to the Aliens
Restriction Act stipulates that this piece of legislation was passed to im-
pose specific restrictions on foreigners and more generally to 'make such
provisions as are necessary or expedient' to fulfil the restriction objective.
Conversely, the Immigration Act was passed to 'amend and consolidate
the law relating to immigration' in particular and 'for matters incidental
thereto and connected therewith' 4 3 in general.
It should be noted from the outset, firstly, that the Aliens Restriction Act
and the Immigration Act are still in the statute books. Secondly, that
although this corpus of legislation contained provisions that could have
been used to protect refugees and asylum seekers in the early days, gener-
ally speaking, they were not so employed. As judicial practice suggests, the
two acts were applied exclusively for immigration matters relating to non-
citizens and without regard to the protection needs of those involved.
44
In the context of refugees in particular, the Aliens Restriction Act and
the Immigration Act were used sparingly to determine claims for asylum.
Let us now look at the salient features of this corpus of legislation.
3.2.1 The Immigration Act (1967)
Under the Immigration Act, before a person is allowed entry into Kenya
they must first apply for and obtain an entry permit. Section 5 of this
Act, read together with its schedule, creates 13 classes of entry permits.
41 Laws of Kenya, ch. 173.
42 Ibid., ch. 172.
43 Preamble to Immigration Act.
44 See, for instance: Mohanlal Shah v. R (1959) EA 951 and Chimanlal Patel v. Attorney-General (1960) EA
388 (on suspected prohibited immigrants); Somji v. Republic (1973) EA 386 (on making a false declaration
to obtain a Kenyan passport); Prabhulal v. Republic (1971) EA 52 (on working unlawfully); Parbat v. Meghji
(1961) EA 540 (on entry permits); Attorney-General v. Shiui Punja (1961) EA 652 (interpretation of
'child').
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Of these, class M acknowledges that a 'refugee' is eligible to apply for an
entry permit. Two categories of persons are eligible to apply: any person
who meets45 the 'refugee' definition and anyone related to the refugee of
the first category by marriage or blood. The class M entry permit cate-
gory defines 'refugee' as any person who has fled their home state owing
to persecution:
For reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who,
not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to return to it; and any wife or child over the age of thirteen years of such a
refugee.
The first category of the Class M definition adopts the classical definition
of 'refugee' found in article 1 (A) of the Refugee Convention as read with
article 1 of the Refugee Protocol. This body of law defines the term
refugee to mean 'any person who':
[O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a national-
ity and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
As for the second category of persons, it is clear that use of the term
'anyone' does not create a carte blanche. Class M limits this group to 'any
wife or child over the age of thirteen years of such a refugee'. It is ap-
parent that Kenya's early refugee system adhered to the principle that if
the head of a family met the criteria of the refugee definition, his de-
pendants would normally be granted refugee status according to the prin-
ciple of family unity.46 These limitations sit uneasily with modern trends
in migration. The term wife, for example, seems to imply that persons
fleeing out of fear of persecution were either exclusively, or primarily,
male and that their wife and/or child followed the husband or father,
respectively. These presumptions are out of touch with reality. As experi-
ence shows, mass movement cuts across classifications of gender and
age. In fact, statistical data suggest that women and children constitute a
significant majority of asylum seekers. 47
45 The Immigration Act section 15(d) lays the burden of proving refugee status on an applicant.
46 Discussed in section 5.3 below.
41 UNHCR, above n. 12, 34-45.
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The use of 'any' to refer to the 'wife' category in particular encompasses
monogamous and polygamous48 marriages. This position is consistent
with section 3 (4) of Kenya's Interpretations and General Provisions
Act, 1956, which reads:
In every written law, except where a contrary intention appears, words and expres-
sions in the singular include the plural and words and expressions in the plural
include the singular.
Looking at the tenor and substance of the Immigration Act, there appears
to be no direct or implied intention that Parliament had any contrary inten-
tion to limit the word 'wife' to its singular. If this were the case it would mean
that, in situations of flight, a polygamous male could be forced to choose only
one wife, thus abandoning the other(s), in order to be allowed entry into the
country. On the contrary, Class M should be interpreted broadly to cover
polygamous marriages as well. At a practical level this means that a wife, or
wives, of a refugee are also entitled to enter Kenya once their husband's
asylum application succeeds. Because the legislation refers to 'any' child,49 the
same arguments can be applied to those who have more than one child.
The age nominated for children is quite interesting in terms of the ages
of children and minors specified by Kenyan 50 and international51 laws.
Section three of this article, which evaluates practical aspects of the
Kenyan refugee regime, discusses these themes further.
Asylum Assessment Procedures
Section 5(2) of the Immigration Act requires applications for refugee status
to be heard and determined by Immigration Officers of the Ministry of
State in the Office of the President. 5 2 Upon satisfaction that an applicant
meets the definition of 'refugee', an officer is then required to issue an
entry permit. The legislation, however, does not clarify the minimum evi-
dence required in order to 'satisfy' an official. Nevertheless, the Act does
provide two indicators. The first indicator can be found in section 11,
which created an inquisitorial regime by requiring applicants to:
Answer any question [posed by an Officer] or produce any document in [their]
possession for the purpose of ... ascertaining whether [they] ... should be permit-
ted to enter Kenya ....
48 This is a common form of marriage and one that is recognised by domestic law. See, for instance,
sections 130(2) and 127(4) of the 1963 Evidence Act. See alsoJustice Waiyaki in EstherKarimi v. Fabian
Murugu HCCC No. 7 of 1973, quoted in Eugene Cotran, Casebook on Kenya Customary Law (Nairobi:
Nairobi University Press, 1991) arguing that Kenya's 'laws provide for both monogamous and polyga-
mous marriages', 25.
49 'Child' is defined by section 2 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1963 and rule 3 of the
Aliens Restriction Act as anyone below the age of eighteen years.
50 Ibid.
51 See, e.g., Art. 1 of the CRC defining 'child' as any person 'below the age of eighteen years'.
52 Section 10 of the Immigration Act empowers the Minister to appoint these Officers.
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Schedule 1 rule 6 then specifies that everyone who wishes to apply for an
entry permit should complete form 3. Rule 6, however, sits uncomforta-
bly with the requirements of form 3, which appears to be designed for
persons seeking to enter the country for commercial or economic pur-
poses. For example, part II of this form requires applicants for class M
entry permits to provide the following details:
* Proposed place of residence/business while in Kenya;
" Profession, trade business or manufacture they wish to engage in;
* Qualifications;
" Previous experience; and
" Capital and income available, sources of income and present locality
of capital.
Rule 6 makes it mandatory for every person to complete form 3. An appli-
cant for a class M entry permit must provide his or her personal details,
namely: full name, current address, date and place of birth, passport
number, nationality and particulars of any child. This implies that the rea-
son for a person's flight is a matter to be determined by an immigration
officer during the course of a subjective question and answer session. Even
at this stage, it is not enough for an applicant to satisfy an immigration
official that he or she is in need of surrogate protection. This is simply a
preliminary step. Section 20(1) grants immigration officers 'discretion' to
issue, or refuse to issue, an entry permit. Unlike the prevailing system in
many formal asylum regimes, the Immigration Act does not require immi-
gration officers to give reasons for their decisions, setting out the grounds
upon which a dissatisfied claimant might lodge an appeal with the Minis-
ter.5 3 The system also provides no hint of the points of law or fact that
rejected applicants might use for appeal and no indication of the chances
of success. In a nutshell, the legislation creates an appellate tier without
requiring primary decision-makers to provide reasons for their decisions.
Whilst this point is discussed further below,54 it is important to note that
the Act also fails to define the factors, or considerations, which might guide
immigration officials to exercise their discretion. Despite this, one can only
surmise that the draftsperson intended that discretion be exercised judi-
ciously, not capriciously.
3.2.2 The Aliens Restriction Act (1973)
Although the Aliens Restriction Act does not consider refugees to be a
special category of non-citizens, its schedule makes a brief reference of
53 Section 5(3) of the Immigration Act provides for appeals for instances where a person is aggrieved
by an Immigration Officer's decision pertaining to an entry permit application.
51 Section six.
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this category of persons. Section 3, read together with rule 4, requires
that all foreigners report to a registration officer within 90 days of arrival
in Kenya. This registration process entails completion of form Al tided
'Form for Registration as an Alien'. Paragraph 10 of this form categorizes
refugees as non-citizens. It asks:
If Refugee in Kenya:
Date of Arrival in Kenya ...............
Have you been accepted as a refugee in Kenya? Yes/No.
The Aliens Restriction Act is silent on the procedures an asylum seeker
might follow in order to be granted refugee status. Therefore, in re-
sponse to the second question, it makes practical sense to infer that the
Immigration Act is the procedural law in this regard. In other words,
the Aliens Restriction Act should be read together with the Immigration
Act in order to make practical sense of paragraph 10 vis-A-vis refugee
matters.
In summary, the Aliens Restriction Act and the Immigration Act pro-
vide the barest legal underpinning that Kenya's asylum system might use
to determine refugee claims. Figure 2 (see next page) is a graphic represen-
tation of the legislative refugee assessment procedures. However, as section
four below demonstrates, the practical process was at odds with its legisla-
tive counterpart.
4. Comparing and contrasting the legal and
practical claim assessment schemes
Before 1991, the Government of Kenya heard and determined refu-
gee claims. Two offices were established within the Ministry of Home
Affairs and National Heritage ('Ministry of Home Affairs') to dis-
charge the Government's refugee mandate: a Special Programme of
Refugees and an Eligibility Committee. The terms of reference of the
Special Programme of Refugees were two-fold. It was required to
manage the day-to-day affairs of the assessment regime and dispense
the Government's refugee policy. Processing of individual claims, on
the other hand, was a function conducted by the Eligibility Committee.
In terms of personnel, one official and two assistants were appointed
to run the Special Programme of Refugees. The Eligibility Commit-
tee, however, was comprised of representatives of the Ministry of
Home Affairs, the Immigration Department and UNHCR. Herein lay
a key difference between the legal provisions and the situation on the
ground.
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Figure 2. Refugee Status Determination in Kenya: The Legislative Structure.
As noted in section three above, the Immigration Department's refugee
mandate derives directly from legislation.5 5 In contrast, the mandate of
the Ministry of Home Affairs stemmed from Government policy. In the
context of assessment of claims, this framework was bound to, and indeed
did, lead to conflict. In particular, it was ambiguous which ministry was to
hear refugee applications. Arthur Andambi, an official in the Ministry of
Home Affairs Refugee Office, points out:
For a long time the Immigration Department felt it should have a wider say in
refugee matters in the absence of specific refugee legislation, since its refugee
mandate derived more directly from a legal source. 56
That said, the Eligibility Committee applied the definition of the Refugee
Convention as contained in class M of the Immigration Act. Further
to this definition, a wider definition of 'refugee' of the OAU Refugee
55 Immigration Act sections 5, 8, 11 and 17; and section 3(l) of the Aliens Restriction Act.
56 Arthur Andambi, 'International Human Rights and Refugee Law', 12 (1998), (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
HeinOnline  -- 19 Int'l J. Refugee L. 64 2007
Past Reflections, Future Insights 65
Convention was employed in practice. Article I of the OAU Refugee
Convention echoes the definition of 'refugee' within the Refugee Con-
vention, but extends the scope of protection to include:
Every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination
or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his coun-
try of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in
order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.
Therefore, persons fleeing situations of armed conflict could also apply
for refugee status. Interestingly, Kenya was by then not party to the OAU
Refugee Convention.5 7 Furthermore, its asylum legislative structure did
not recognise war and civil strife as causes of flight.
Another difference between the law in the books and actual practice lies
in the role of UNHCR in the protection equation. The legal structure was,
and still is, silent on this aspect. However, in practice, the mandate of the
UNHCR was defined generally as a helping partner.58 The agency played
a minor general role in overseeing refugees and addressing other refugee-
related issues. Later, its function expanded to cover provision of funds to
run a refugee Reception Centre, whilst its Protection Officer sat in Eligibil-
ity Committee proceedings. In its early stages, UNHCR's Nairobi office
was quite small in terms of personnel. It comprised a Representative of
the High Commissioner, a Deputy, a Programme Division, a Protection
Division and a Social Services Division.
Based on the general composition of the Eligibility Committee it appears
that it was comprised of laypersons, as was the case with immigration offi-
cials. There is no obvious evidence of members possessing legal qualifica-
tions. Incorporating legal persons into the claim assessment system may
have benefited the proceedings by introducing a stronger legal basis to the
interpretations of refugee and other relevant international human rights
treaties. As has been argued previously, the 'complex nature' of the refugee
application process 'requires a legal not a lay mind'. 59 In practice, the Eli-
gibility Committee seems to have operated without formal legal advice or
guidance. However, the absence of legal involvement only pertained to the
period preceding UNHCR's active participation in Eligibility Committee
proceedings. Nonetheless, there is some possibility that the Protection
Officer did not possess legal qualifications.
4.1 Refugee status determination process
Before 1991 Kenya did not have refugee camps. Instead, refugees and
asylum seekers were hosted at a Reception Centre located in Thika town,
57 It ratified the OAU Refugee Convention on 23June 1992.
58 This practise is consistent with art. 8 of the OAU Refugee Convention, which calls on states to
'co-operate with' the UNHCR.
59 E. Odhiambo-Abuya, 'The Refugee Bill: Some Preliminary Comments', (2003) 60 The Lawuyr 5, 7.
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approximately 50 kilometres north of Nairobi. The Reception Centre,
funded by UNHCR and administered by the Kenyan Government, had
the capacity for three to five hundred persons.60 The Reception Centre
also served a dual purpose. The Eligibility Committee used it to conduct
individual asylum interviews twice a week, in addition to the UNHCR
Nairobi Office which catered for individuals who were unable to go to
Thika. The Reception Centre also housed refugees and asylum seekers
whose applications were being processed. Availing registration and resi-
dence sites is consistent with the general tenor of Kenya's refugee legisla-
tive framework. Whereas rule 4 of the Aliens Restriction Act necessitates
that non-citizens register with the authorities within 90 days of entry into
Kenya, section 3(1) empowers the Minister to make provision requiring
them 'to reside and remain within certain places or districts'. 6 1 However,
the Aliens Registration Act in particular fails to provide specifically for
the Thika Reception Centre or the UNHCR Nairobi Office as places of
refugee registration or assessment of claims.62
Applicants for refugee status were required to fulfil three procedural
requirements. They were required to complete a questionnaire, attend an
interview and pass a security test. Rejected applicants had the option to
appeal. The entire process is said to have taken some three months. 63
4.1.1 Completion of questionnaire
Prospective refugees were required to complete a standard UNHCR
questionnaire form and return it to officials of the Ministry of Home
Affairs, weeks and sometimes months in advance of the interview. What
remains unclear, however, is whether unaccompanied minors - persons
under 18 years of age - were entitled to make similar claims. Generally
speaking, the questionnaire offered several advantages to both the appli-
cants and the Eligibility Committee. For applicants it provided an
opportunity for them to tell their side of the story in detail and in a more
relaxed atmosphere. Similarly, it enabled the Eligibility Committee to
establish, at face value, whether a claim was genuine or not. Completing
the form in advance gave the Eligibility Committee sufficient time to
familiarise itself with the claim as well as collect necessary data and in-
formation pertaining to the case prior to interviewing claimants. The
registration requirements are consistent with similar provisions of the
Aliens Restriction Act.64 However, a key difference between the legislative
6 0 James Martin, This is Our Exile: A Spiritual Journey with the Refugees of East Africa (New York: Orbis
Books, 1999), 15.
61 See also regulation 4 Aliens Registration Act.
62 A list of registration centres is set out in the second schedule of the Aliens Registration Act.
63 See Skari and Girardet, above n. 21, 15.
64 Para. 10.
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scheme and its practical counterpart lay in the contents of the two
registration forms. It is apparent that the UNHCR form offered more
detail and information than its legal counterpart.
4.1.2 Interview
During the interview, asylum seekers were required to narrate their
story orally and to explain why they fled their state of origin. In cases
where a claimant and an Eligibility Officer lacked a common language,
interpreters were employed to bridge the communication gap. As
Chief Justice Mwendwa of the High Court of Kenya underpinned in
Andrea v. R:65
We cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of interpreting the proceedings
to the accused in the language which he understands, through an interpreter.66
Although Andrea was a criminal matter, the words of the court on the
subject of interpreters are instructive. Based on oral evidence, and the
previously completed questionnaire form, the Eligibility Committee might
then ask questions in order to clarify some aspect. Although, in a major-
ity of cases, what they sought to establish was whether an applicant was
able to recount the answers previously provided in the questionnaire
form.6 7 Consequently, a claimant's success was often measured by his or
her ability to recite their stories without flaws. More fundamentally, claim-
ants also had to demonstrate they were victims of persecution or armed
conflict. To a large extent this procedure conformed to that contained in
the Immigration Act.
The following two points need expanding. International refugee treaties
exclude persons who are alleged to have committed certain offences from
seeking protection under their terms. Articles IF and 1(5) of the Refugee
Convention and OAU Refugee Convention respectively exclude from
protection any asylum seeker who:
(a) has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against
humanity.
(b) has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge
prior to his [or her] admission to that country as a refugee; or
(c) has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations.
In contrast, the Immigration Act lacked such an exclusion clause. This
meant that if the Act had been interpreted strictly, criminals, spies, terror-
ists, saboteurs and other such elements could have been granted status
65 (1970) EALR 46.
66 Ibid., 48 '(Chanan SinghJ concurring)'.
67 Andambi, n. 56 above, 15.
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once they met the 'refugee' definition. In practice, however, this was not
the case. Rather, all refugee claimants were required to undergo a security
test which was aimed at sifting individuals who posed a risk to the country.
Further, it appears that, as soon as claimants were granted refugee status,
they could remain permanently in Kenya. This is because the legal
procedures did not outline any instances where refugee status might be
revoked. To put it in another way, the system lacked a cessation clause.6 8
4.1.3 Securio vetting
Success at Eligibility Committee level was not the only hurdle a claimant
was required to overcome. The Eligibility Committee forwarded all suc-
cessful applicants to Kenya's intelligence agency, popularly known as the
Special Branch. Although this stage is not provided for in the legal proc-
ess, it was a step in the right direction keeping in mind that most claimants
had fled regions ravaged by armed conflict. As is the practice in many
asylum assessment regimes, 69 it was the responsibility of the intelligence
agency to examine the backgrounds of all recommended claimants in
order to sift out criminals, saboteurs and spies. Unlike the Eligibility Com-
mittee, which conducted personal interviews, the Special Branch relied
entirely on its intelligence network. Owing to the fact that many claimants
were from war-torn states, the Government of Kenya was primarily con-
cerned with investigating foreigners admitted to the country as refugees.
Failing to do so might have severely compromised the country's internal
security. After vetting the applicants, a list of 'clean' persons, eligible to be
granted entry permits, was sent to the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry
of Home Affairs. This list was then forwarded to the Eligibility Committee
and, finally, the claimant was informed of the outcome.
4.1.4 Appeals
Rejected claimants, like any other category of non-citizens under the
Immigration Act, were entitled to appeal against unfavourable decisions.
68 Articles 1 C of the Refugee Convention and 1(4) OAU Refugee Convention outline at least five
instances when a person will be deemed not to require international protection. If:
* he has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his nationality;
" having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it;
" he has acquired a new nationality and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality;
* he has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside which he remained
owing to fear of persecution; or
" he can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as
a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country
of his nationality.
69 For example, in Australia all asylum seekers are required to meet the character requirement
before being granted refugee status. See Australian Migration Regulations schedule 2 clauses 447.611,
449.511,451.611,785.611,786.511.
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However, unlike under the terms of the legal framework where appeals
were directed to the Minister of State in the Office of the President,70 in
practice, senior officers of the Eligibility Committee heard appeals. Under
both regimes, the right of appeal seems to have been undermined by the
fact that there was no corresponding duty on decision-makers to provide
reasons for decisions. This theme is discussed further in section seven
below.
In both law and practice, asylum hearings were held in camera and, as
such, members of the public were not allowed to attend. Further, in
practice, the Eligibility Committee's decisions were not published. As a
result, there is no data or information on which to draw concrete con-
clusions about how appeals were decided. It appears, however, that the
Special Branch re-vetted all appellants whose claims were accepted.
4.1.5 Complementary protection
For asylum seekers whose claims were rejected, either at first instance or
on appeal, at least in terms of UNHCR protection and assistance, this
did not mark the end. UNHCR provided complementary protection, is-
suing some rejected asylum seekers with a card declaring the holder to
have 'mandate' status. According to UNHCR, a mandate refugee refers
to a person 'who meets the criteria of the UNHCR Statute ... regardless
of whether or not' the host state is party to the refugee international
treaties or it has 'recognized' the person as a refugee. 71
Mandate refugees, who were the concern of the UNHCR only, did not
receive any form of assistance from the Government of Kenya. The same
applied to asylum claimants rejected under the provisions of the legal
structure. Nevertheless, organizations and churches such as the National
Council of Churches Kenya ('NCCK') and the Church of the Province of
Kenya ('CPK') did not distinguish between mandate and 'full' status refu-
gees. The NCCK, for example, granted both categories of refugees an
equal amount of stipend to support them whilst they looked for employ-
ment.72 Since mandate refugees were not strictly speaking refugees, they,
like other failed applicants, were subject to removal from Kenya. What
remains unclear, however, is whether the Government took practical steps
to repatriate them. Figure 3 below outlines the procedures that were used
in practice to assess asylum claims.
70 Section 5(3) of the Immigration Act.
71 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva: UNHCR, 1992)
('UNHCR Handbook') para. 16.
72 Skari and Girardet, above n. 21, 15.
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Figure 3. Assessment of Asylum claims in Kenya, 1980 1991: The Practical
Scheme.
5. Nature of refugee status and accompanying
entitlements
In practice, all successful applicants were issued with an identification
card that was jointly signed by the Minister of Home Affairs and UNHCR.
It simply declared that a holder was a 'full' status refugee, without any
additional information. Whilst the provisions of domestic law were silent
on the entitlements due to full status refugees, practice suggests that
the rights they were granted to some extent conformed to international
norms. Even though the status itself was temporary, refugees, some of
whom were accommodated at the Thika Reception Centre, could work,
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be reunited with their families, receive medical attention and attend
school. More importantly, they were not refouled.
5.1 Nature of protection offered
The Thika Reception Centre was established as a temporary transit camp
to house refugees and asylum seekers. However, the reality was somewhat
different. Owing to the persistent state of civil strife in the refugees' home
states, many forced migrants spent several years awaiting repatriation to
their home states or resettlement in third states. Some contend that many
refugees spent up to four years awaiting resettlement or repatriation. 73
This Reception Centre, originally designed to house between 300 and
500 persons, found that, in most instances, it had to admit far more than
its carrying capacity74 owing to the rising number of claims. As such,
many refugees had to reside outside the Reception Centre.
One reason was that practical considerations made it difficult to accom-
modate the entire refugee population at the Reception Centre. Addition-
ally, in its early stages, Kenya's asylum policy appears to have been lenient.
This, therefore, allowed asylum refugees to move freely, reside outside the
designated area and, subsequently, integrate into the local community.
This state of affairs is consistent with international refugee law, which obli-
gates asylum states to allow refugees 'the right to choose their place of
residence' and to 'move freely' within their boundaries. 75 Notably, article
12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
read together with the Refugee Convention, limits the enjoyment of this
right where it is 'necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre
public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others ... '.
The Reception Centre predominantly housed refugees from Somalia,
Uganda, Ethiopia, and Sudan 'in dormitories for single men', 'single
women' and 'family units' for those with families.76 Many of those housed
were waiting for a durable solution to their situation, such as repatriation
or resettlement to a third state. However, the rising population, coupled
with reduced accommodation space, forced newcomers into inappropriate
living conditions. According to James Martin, a Jesuit Refugee Services
official, some new comers lived in 'plain mud houses held together by
branches'. 77 Occasionally, church organizations such as CPK provided
housing assistance to asylum seekers when the Thika Reception Center
73 Martin, above n. 60, 15.
74 For instance, when Martin visited the Reception Centre he found it housing 'more than five
thousand people'. Martin, above n. 60, 15.
75 Art. 26 Refugee Convention.
76 Elizabeth Ferris, 'The Thika Reception Centre', (1986) 30 Refugees 41, 41.
77 Above n. 60, 16.
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was 'full'. 78 However, other conditions at the Reception Centre were less
than ideal, as Martin explains:
The camp itself resembled many of the slums scattered throughout Nairobi, slums
I would later know well: wood-and-mud houses, ears of corn roasting over small
charcoal fires, open sewers, and trash everywhere. There was severe lack of toilet
facilities (enough to accommodate only the original five hundred people) and a
resulting foul smell around the camp .... But unlike the slums in Nairobi, the
Thika camp is bordered by barbed wire and patrolled by Kenyan police officers.
.... Most [refugees] lived in plain mud houses held together by branches.
Malnutrition was a major problem, particularly among the children. Because of
the large pools of stagnant water in the camp, malaria was also common. Rice was
served twice a day, and meat, according to refugees ..., was a rarity. In the entire
camp there was only one social worker to cope with an enormous caseload of
thousands of people, all with severe problems - hunger, sickness, family worries,
resettlement concerns, and fear. She found it difficult to deal with the endless
strain of cases ..... 1]here was [also] very little to do [in terms of recreation].
Occasionally, there might be a soccer ball for children to use on a large, barren
field, but it was a precious commodity. Most of the men and women ... spent a
good deal of time squatting in the doorways of their small homes, waiting.
The overall effect of the camp - the poverty, the smell, the halted lives of the
refugees - evoked a wave of sadness that passed over me like a physical thing.79
In short, the Thika Reception Centre was an '[un]pleasant place', as
Tala Skari and Edward Girardet observe.80
5.2 Employment, education and health needs
5.2.1 Employment
The Kenyan Government decided which persons to admit as 'refugees'.
However, as Elizabeth Ferris, an official of the World Council of Churches
('WCC'), points out, churches and other aid agencies shouldered 'most
of the responsibility for the refugees' integration into Kenya life'. 81 The
NCCK Refugee Service Unit for instance, assisted refugees search for
employment in the domestic market by posting job vacancies on a bul-
letin board. It also engaged a Job Placement Officer to counsel refugees
on 'employment opportunities'. 82 Churches also provided training in
trades such as tailoring, masonry and carpentry, whereupon, after comple-
tion, some trainees opted to be self-employed. The assistance the UNHCR
offered was also designed to encourage refugees to be self-sufficient. 83
78 Ferris, above n. 76, 42.
79 Martin, above n. 60, 15-17.
80 Above n. 21, 15.
81 Above n. 76, 41.
82 Ibid., 42.
83 UNHCR, 'East Africa: Kenya', (1988) Refugees (Special Issue) 17, 17.
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In 1988, for instance, 60 per cent of its assistance budget was devoted to
activities and projects geared towards realising this goal.84
This situation is consistent with international refugee and human rights
laws, which recognise the importance of encouraging refugees to be
self-reliant. Article 17 of the Refugee Convention, for example, requires
states to:
Accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the most favourable treatment
accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances, as regards
the right to engage in wage-earning employment.
Host-states are also required to undertake measures that will facilitate
refugees' self-employment. 85 International human rights laws also recog-
nize the right to work. Article 23 of the UDHR, for example, declares
that 'everyone has the right to work'. Recognizing this entitlement, article
6 of the ICESCR requires states to 'take appropriate steps to safeguard
this right'.
Employment enables a forced migrant to become a productive member
of society. Promoting refugees' access to the labour market was thus a pos-
itive step. Describing the right to work as 'one of the most important' enti-
tlements granted to refugees under international refugee law, Nehemiah
Robinson argues convincingly that without this entitlement the protection
offered by international human rights and refugee laws may to a large
extent be rendered 'practically meaningless'. 86 Indeed, one of the main
challenges that refugees inevitably face in their quest to establish a new life
in developing world states is lack of jobs and employment opportunities.
Employment would give refugees an opportunity to earn an income and
therefore reduce the dependency syndrome. Furthermore, employment
would also provide refugees with something useful to occupy their time.
Some refugees, particularly those with educational qualifications and
professional skills as well as training, found it easier to secure employment
in Kenya's private and public sectors than their counterparts who lacked
expertise. Tala Skari and Edward Girardet cite the case of an Eritrean
refugee in Kenya known only as 'TK', who was formerly an executive in
his home state. According to the authors, TK was able to find 'a job as the
manager of an import/export firm in Nairobi' 8 7 almost immediately. Sim-
ilarly, some Ugandan teachers, who had been forced to flee the country
during Idi Amin's reign, found employment in Kenyan schools.88 This
84 Ibid.
85 Refugee Convention, arts. 18-19.
86 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Its History, Contents and Interpretation
(New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1953), 114.
87 Above n. 21, 15.
88 See Yash Tandon, 'Ugandan Refugees in Kenya: A Community of Enforced Self-Reliance',
(1984) 8 Disasters 267.
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evidence is consistent with empirical research conducted in the United
States,89 Canada90 and New Zealand. 9 1 In his survey on the participation
of female immigrants in the United States labour market between 1970
and 1990, Robert Schoeni found that 'education plays an important role in
determining the differences in labor force participation among immigrant
groups'. 92 This evidence corroborates Rainer Winkelmann's claim that:
Immigrants [with] high levels of productivity or skills that are in high demand,
are more likely to make a significant contribution to economic growth than are
immigrants who have difficulty finding employment .... 93
However, cases such as TK's were quite rare in Kenya. It was a 'miracle'
for a refugee to find work, as some would have it.9 4 Owing to scarce job
opportunities, very few professional refugees were able to secure employ-
ment,95 let alone find jobs to match their academic qualifications and
skills. For example, trained teachers or civilian administrators were forced
to do sweeping jobs, if they were lucky.96 Differences in language and
customs, as well as lack of contacts, may also explain why refugees had
difficulty finding jobs. Ultimately, many were forced to rely on the social
assistance offered by UNHCR, Church organizations and other aid agen-
cies. NCCK, for example, distributed 'a small allowance to the refugees
for six months (for a single person about US$125 for the first month, then
US$18 for 5 months) while they were looking for work or exploring edu-
cational opportunities'. 9 7 After that, they were expected to fend for them-
selves, which was extremely difficult as a UNHCR official explains:
It's a never kind of thing .... Sometimes the refugees can be very resilient. They
seem to get stronger with the pressures they face. But the ones that fall, fall hard.
They can reach a threshold where they can no longer cope.98
This state of affairs lends support to Winkelmann's proposition that the
'need for social assistance' is higher for immigrants who fail to 'adapt
89 Robert Schoeni, 'Labor Market Outcomes of Immigrant Women in the United States 1970 to
1990' (1998) 31 InternationalMgration Review 57.
90 Peter Li, 'Immigrants' Propensity to Self-Employment: Evidence from Canada', (2001) 35
International Mgration Review 1106.
91 Rainer Winkelmann, 'The Labor Market Performance of European Immigrants in New
Zealand in the 1980s and 1990s', (2000) 34 International Migration Review 33.
92 Above n. 89, 66.
93 Above n. 91, 34.
94 See, e.g., Yefime Zarjevski, A Future Preserved: International Assistance to Refugees (Oxford: Pergamon
Press, 1988), 146.
95 In 1984, for instance, a mere 'one percent of the refugees found employment', according to Skari
and Girardet, above n. 21, 14.
96 Skari and Girardet, ibid., 15.
97 Ferris, above n. 76, 41.
98 See Skari and Girardet, above n. 21, 15.
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rapidly to conditions in the [local] labor market'. 99 In its 1988 Report on
Kenya, UNHCR described the situation in the following way:
The difficulties inherent in any integration and self-sufficiency effort in the urban
environment, given the amount of unemployment and chronic under-employment
in Kenya, render ongoing assistance indispensable for needy refugees, the dis-
abled, and obviously those who have just arrived. 100
This harsh situation was ameliorated to some extent by development
assistance offered by agencies such as the International Labour Organiza-
tion ('ILO'). The ILO operated a grant and loans scheme for those
refugees who wished to venture into small-scale income generating ac-
tivities. 10 1 However, owing to limited resources, the large refugee popula-
tion and limited employment opportunities, it is reasonable to expect that
many refugees spent the better part of the day idle.
5.2.2 Education
Under the terms of international refugee and human rights laws, asylum
states are required to facilitate refugees' access to public education. Article
22 of the Refugee Convention mandates states to 'accord to refugees the
same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect to elementary educa-
tion". This requirement is consistent with articles 26 and 13 of the UDHR
and ICESCR, respectively which guarantee everyone the right to education.
Education is important in the life of a refugee for a number of fundamental
reasons. Primarily, access to educational facilities ensures that the chain of
learning, which might have been severed during displacement, is continued.
In addition to increasing the chances of refugees becoming self sufficient in
the future, education also reduces the trauma of being in a foreign country,
as well as ensuring that the period spent in asylum is productively utilized.
English and other language courses were offered to assist refugees estab-
lish a new life in Kenya. The Kenya Catholic Secretariat ('KCS') adminis-
tered an educational assistance program that was mainly funded jointly by
the UNHCR and WCC. Within this program disadvantaged students were
offered scholarships to pursue courses in Kenya's educational institutions.
This was designed to elevate underprivileged students from dependency to
a level of self-sufficiency. Initially, KCS was able to offer scholarships to
many refugees. However, following a rise in the number of applicants,
together with finite resources, KCS had more applications than it could
support as Ferris explains:
[In 1986], 1,400 refugees are receiving scholarships at all levels - from primary to
university education and for vocational training. But the demand is much greater
99 Above n. 83, 34.
100 UNHCR, above n.83, 17.
11l Ibid.
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than KCS' resources can meet. In 1985, [less than 20 per cent of the] applications
... received ... were accepted for the 1986 academic year. 102
Lack of financial support was not only bound to impact significantly on the
ability of refugees to pursue their academic aspirations but also stood to
affect their future prospects. As many refugees came to realize, 'their best
hope for a good job and hopeful future lies in education'. 10 3 To promote
this academic goal, the NCCK Refugee Services Unit posted notices on its
bulletin board showing school examination dates in order to assist refugees,
especially those who were unable to attend school consistently. Moreover,
the KCS organised 'visits' to schools and other institutions of higher learn-
ing to assess performance. 10 4 The Secretariat also provided counselling to
those students whose academic performance fell below a set standard. 105
Aside from formal education, informal education was also provided. For
example, part of the UNHCR 'principal objectives' for 1988 was to offer
vocational training at various levels and language courses (English and
Swahili) for Ethiopian, Rwandese and Somali refugees, in particular.10 6
Ability to communicate is key to many other aspects of a refugees' life:
finding adequate employment, accommodation, dealing with officials and
assimilating into their new society.
In sum, the provision of education facilities per se was a step in the right
direction and one that sits comfortably with the provisions of international
refugee and human rights laws. However, owing to the large refugee popula-
tion and the limited number of educational facilities, ultimately, only a small
number of refugees had access to education and language programmes.
5.2.3 Health
Article 23 of the Refugee Convention requires host states to 'accord to
refugees lawfully staying in their territory the same treatment with re-
spect to public relief and assistance as is accorded to their nationals'.
International human rights laws also recognize this right. Whereas the
UDHR 107 and ICESCR 10 8 provide for the right to medical care, article
12(2) of the ICESCR sets out steps that states can take to realise this
entitlement:
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality
and for the healthy development of the child;
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene;




106 UNIICR, above n. 83, 17.
107 Art. 25.
108 Art. 12(1).
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(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational
and other diseases;
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and
medical attention in the event of sickness.
As in the case of accommodation, education and employment, church
organizations, UNHCR, and other aid agencies provided medical care
and attention to meet the physical and the psychological needs of refu-
gees, many of whom had had traumatic experiences. Ferris describes the
role played by NCCK, for example:
Counsellors from NCCK meet with the refugees on a regular basis, a medical
counsellor deals with health problems .... Social workers visit those refugees who
are sick or disturbed and alone. 10 9
Once again, the sheer number of refugees and limited resources made it
difficult to treat all medical ailments suffered by refugees. Nonetheless,
the little that was provided was a positive step and one that was consistent
with international laws.
5.3 Family unity and reunification
The family is the basic unit of any society and it is through this institution
that new members of any political community are introduced and nur-
tured. In Africa, this institution is primarily responsible for teaching chil-
dren cultural and religious values, as well as the skills necessary to become
self-supporting adults.' 10 While formally recognising the important role
that a family plays in any political community, international human rights
laws have prescribed measures that are designed to keep this unit intact.
Commencing with the 1948 UDHR, key international human rights
treaties such as the 1976 ICESCR, the 1976 ICCPR and, more recently,
the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child ('CRC')1 11 have formally
underpinned the role of the family in society. As the UDHR, these trea-
ties recognise the family as the natural and fundamental unit of society.
These instruments bestow an obligation upon states, as well as society in
general, to undertake measures that will safeguard rather than put this
institution at risk. 112
The family unit is even more important in times of flight and during
resettlement in an asylum state. Considering the chaos of conflict and
flight, it is reasonable to expect that family members may be separated
temporarily or, sometimes, permanently. At the Conference of Plenipoten-
tiaries, where the Refugee Convention was drafted, the Holy See delegate
109 Ferris, above n. 76, 41.
I0 Sarah Norton-Stall, 'African Refugee Families', (1994) 95 Refugees 29, 30.
1l1 Above n. 28.
112 Arts.: 16 UDHR, 10 ICESCR, 23 ICCPR and 2 CRC.
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stressed that the 'unity' of a refugee family 'is constantly threatened by a
variety of measures relating either to admission to the receiving country, or
to other circumstances connected with the refugee's life'. 113 Children,
defined generally as any person under the age of 18, seeking asylum may
find themselves in exceptionally distressing situations. 114 Field data have
documented the trauma and anxiety that unaccompanied and separated
children face in refugee host states:
Sometimes I cry for my parents, when I see some girls or boys walking with their
parents. I can feel that I don't have anybody in this world. I sometimes miss my
mother when I am ill or hungry. I miss my father when I am ill or when I need
someone to tell me stories. And I miss my sister and brother when I need someone
to make fun. 115
I was not pleased to leave my country, coming out to a foreign land ... when
I don't have anyone to take care of me.... I cry nearly every night. I worry all
day and all night about this kind of ridiculous life. 116
Thus, where members of one family can be located it is desirable that
they should be expeditiously reunited in the host state. This is in keeping
with Article 10(1) of the CRC, which requires states to deal with applica-
tions for family reunification in a 'positive, humane and expeditious man-
ner'. Indeed, the family institution is best poised to ameliorate the trauma
of displacement and promote assimilation into the new environment. In
a survey that the present author conducted on Kenya's asylum regime, 117
Kayihura (a pseudonym), a refugee from Rwanda, highlights the impor-
tant role a family plays in exile:
When the war broke out in Rwanda, we fled to Tanzania and later Kenya without
my father. For almost two years we never saw nor heard any news from him. One
day as me, my younger sister, and mum were waiting to see a Non-Governmental
Organization representative in Nairobi I went outside to buy some food since I
was hungry. To my surprise, I saw somebody who looked like dad. At first I thought
I was having hallucinations. But I moved closer and spoke to him. To my great
surprise it was dad! I do not have words to express my joy - we hugged, shed tears,
kissed and .... you can imagine the rest for yourself. I took him to where mum
and my sister were and it was a very emotional reunion. Unfortunately, dad died
113 UN General Assembly, 'Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless
Persons (Item 6 of the agenda)', A/CONE2/103 (24July 1951).
114 See generally, Margaret McCallin, (ed), The Pgychological Well-Being of Refigee Children: Research,
Practice and Policy Issues (Geneva: International Catholic Child Bureau, 1996).
115 Beatrice Kollie, 17 year old Liberian refugee in Ghana. Quoted in 'My Family: Excerpts From
Essays Written Especially for the International Year of the Family by Refugee Children in Ghana',
(1994) 95 Refigees 18, 18.
116 Julius Seitua, 17 year old Liberian refugee in Ghana. Quoted in ibid., 19.
117 For the results of this survey, see E. Odhiambo-Abuya: 'Refugee Status Imtaxaan in Kenya: An
Empirical Survey', (2004) 48journal of African Law 187; 'Refugees and Their Interpreters: The Kenyan
Experience', (2004) 26 Australian Review of Afiican Studies 66.
HeinOnline  -- 19 Int'l J. Refugee L. 78 2007
Past Reflections, Future Insights 79
one-and-a-half years later. But, I tell you those were the best years of my family
Now we are not only miles away from home but extremely lonely. 118
A reunited family may also be better placed to assess when conditions
at home are conducive for repatriation, unlike a dispersed family.
Despite the important role a family is likely to play in the new environ-
ments refugees find themselves in, international refugee law is silent on the
issue of family reunification. It is simplistic to argue, nonetheless, that fam-
ily unity and reunification, in instances where members of a family are
separated, are entitlements that are not guaranteed to refugees. 119 On the
contrary, jurisprudence of the rights of the refugee family from various
legal sources including soft law,120 humanitarian law,12 1 state practise, 122
and, as noted above, human rights law, 123 have subsequently filled this gap.
This evidence points out that refugee host states are obligated to reunite
refugees with family members, once family ties are established.
Kenya's early asylum system seems to have recognized the importance
of family unity as it provided for reunification. TK, for example, during an
interview with Skari and Girardet, said that he was making plans to bring
his family to Kenya. Tom, from Uganda, had already been joined by his
wife and children. 124 In the case of TK, Skari and Girardet note further
that 'loneliness' was beginning to enter his life despite his economic afflu-
ence in Kenya. 125 This state of affairs is consistent with research find-
ings reported elsewhere, which suggest that refugees separated from their
families experience sadness, depression and loneliness. 126
5.4 Prohibition from refoulement
International refugee and human rights laws decree that any person who
has been forced to flee their home states owing to persecution may seek
118 Interview with Kayihura, Kakuma Refugeee Camp, Kenya, 25Jan. 2003.
119 The Australian Federal Government is an example of a refugee-receiving State that has consist-
ently held this view. See (Australia) Department of Immigration and Multi-cultural Affairs (DIMIA),
Interpreting the RePugees Convention-An Australian Perspective (Canberra: DIMIA, 2002), 190-194.
120 See: Recommendation B of the Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries which adopted
the Refugee Convention requiring States to promote family unity; Ex Coin Conclusion No. 15 (XXX)
1979 calling on states to 'facilitate' family reunification for 'humanitarian reasons' (para. (e)).
121 See: Articles 24 and 26 of Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, 12 Aug. 1949, 75 UNTS 287, entered into force 21 Oct. 1950; Art. 74 Additional Pro-
tocol I, Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977,
UNTS 1125, entered into force 7 Dec. 1978, prohibiting occupying powers from separating families.
122 According to UNHCR, the family unity principle is 'observed by the majority of States, whether
or not [they are party] to the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol'. See UNHCR Handbook, above
n. 71, para. 183.
123 Above n.112.
124 Skari and Girardet, above n. 21, 14 & 15.
125 Ibid. According to the authors, TK was by then living 'in a comfortable house in the suburbs
and driv[ing] his own car', 14.
126 See, for instance, Everett Ressler, Neil Boothby and Daniel Steinbock, Unaccompanied Children:
Care and Protection in Wars, Natural Disasters, and Refugee Movements (New York: Oxford University Press,
1988) 153-173.
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protection in another state. Article 14 of the 1948 UDHR, for example,
guarantees 'everyone' 'the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asy-
lum from persecution'. However, states are not obligated to admit asylum
seekers. At best, the OAU Refugee Convention calls on African States to 'use
their best endeavours consistent with their respective legislations to receive
refugees and to secure [their] settlement'. 12 7 The travauxpreparatoires (drafting
history) of the Refugee Convention show reluctance by states to provide for
the right of entry to asylum seekers. This was seen as an encroachment to
or dilution of their sovereignty. Nonetheless, states are prohibited from ex-
pelling or returning refugees to territories where they fear for their lives.
The prohibition of the return or expulsion ('refouler) of refugees' to states
where they fear for their lives is one of the cornerstones of refugee protec-
tion. This norm is codified internationally in Articles 32 and 33 of the
Refugee Convention. 128 Article 32 sets constraints on the ability of states
to expel a refugee lawfully in their territory:
(1) The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory
save on grounds of national security or public order.
(2) The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision
reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling
reasons of national security otherwise require, the refugee shall be allowed to
submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be represented for the
purpose before competent authority or a person or persons specially desig-
nated by the competent authority.
Article 33 provides for the norm of non-refoulement. It prohibits States from:
[E] xpel [ling] or return [ing] ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account
of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.
These provisions are consistent with a proposal made by the Swedish delegate
at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries. 129 The OAU Refugee Convention
also contains the non-rfoulenent prohibition. Article 2(3) of this treaty reads:
No person shall be subjected by a Member State to measures such as rejection
at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would compel him to return to or
127 See art. 2(1).
128 International human rights laws also recognize the non-refoulement principle. For instance, art. 3(1)
of the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, GA Res.
39/46 of 10 Dec. 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987), prohibits states from
'expel[ling], return[ing] ("refouler") or extradit[ing] a person to another State where there are substan-
tial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture'.
129 The original Swedish proposal reads: 'No Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion,
or where he would be exposed to the risk of being sent to a territory where his life of freedom would
thereby be endangered'. See UN General Assembly, 'Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of
Refugees and Stateless Persons (Item 6 of the agenda)', A/CONF2/70 (I IJuly 1951).
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remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or liberty would be
threatened ....
The non-refoulement principle was not legislatively incorporated into Kenya's
early domestic legal framework. Thus, as a dualist state, it was not legally
bound to observe this rule. Some claim that the government of Kenya did
refoule refugees from neighbouring states. For example, discussing the poli-
tics of humanitarian assistance in the context of forced migration, Monica
Juma alleges that owing to deteriorating economic conditions and escalat-
ing insecurity in the country 'in July 1979, some 2,500 Ugandans were
picked up in night police swoops and dumped over the border ... '.130
Further, she writes that by mid-1982 'acts of refoulement had increased
dramatically'. 13 1 This position can be criticised for a number of reasons.
The first criticism lies in the fact that the author fails to cite the source of
references upon which her assertions are based. In addition, assuming that
these events did take place, it is reasonable to expect that such incidents
would be reported in local and/or international newspapers. Extensive
research of archival databases, regarding refugees in Kenya from 1963
to 1990, show there is no such record. Furthermore, there is very little
contemporaneous academic literature to support the claim that there was
a dramatic rise in, or incidents of, refoulement under Kenya's early refugee
protection regime. In short, Juma's position is problematic.
To reiterate, Kenya did not incorporate the non-refoulement principle into
its legislative framework and, therefore, was not obliged to adhere to it.
Moreover, allegations that the government refouled refugees in 1979 and
mid-1982, using the examples of Juma, are difficult to substantiate. There-
fore, it could be argued that Kenya did not refoule refugees. There are two
reasons that explain this. The first reason lies in the fact that Kenya, a
signatory to the international refugee treaties that prohibit refoulement, was
intent on observing this rule, despite failure by domestic law to recognize
this prohibition. A second, and more likely explanation, lies in the asser-
tion that Kenya, primarily due to financial reasons, was unable to meet its
refugee obligations. Therefore, even if the government wanted to refoule
forced migrants, it could not do so because of these constraints. This line
of thinking sits comfortably with the assertion advanced by Animesh
Ghoshal and Thomas Crowley who state that 'what may appear to be an
open migration policy may be nothing more than the inability of the gov-
ernment [of Kenya] to effect any control over' 1 32 refugees in its territory.
130 MonicaJuma, 'The Politics of Humanitarian Assistance: State, Non-State Actors and Displace-
ment in Kenya and Uganda (1989-1998)', unpublished Doctor of Philosophy Thesis, University of
Oxford (2000), 132.
131 Ibid.
132 Animesh Ghoshal and Thomas Crowley, 'Refugees and Immigrants: A Human Rights
Dilemma', (1983) 5 HRQ327, 347.
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A third possible explanation lies in an assertion put forward by some who
contend that by the early 1980s the principle of non-refoulement was so well
accepted that it had become a rule of customary international law - that
is, law that has evolved from the practice and customs of states. Hence,
according to proponents of this school of thought, asylum states were pro-
hibited from returning refugees to areas where they feared for their lives,
regardless of whether or not the domestic legal regime contained provi-
sions prohibiting refoulement. Commentators like Goldman and Martin, as
well as Goodwin-Gill, subscribe to this view. In an article published in
1983, Goldman and Martin claim that the non-refoulement prohibition was
by then embodied in a number of regional treaties and agreements, in
addition to international refugee law. Further, they claim that the norm
had 'received widespread authoritative recognition throughout the
world'. 133 Accordingly, they conclude, 'this principle has evolved from a
basic humanitarian duty into a general principle of international law that
binds all states, even in the absence of an express treaty obligation'. 134
Goodwin-Gill also draws a similar conclusion. He argues that because this
prohibition had 'established itself as a general principal of international
law' states were bound 'automatically and independently of any specific
assent'. 135
The first part of the argument advanced by proponents of this school
does not pose serious concerns. In support of their position, they cite
treaty and soft laws which embodied the non-refoulement principle. Whereas
Goldman and Martin refer to the 1957 European Convention on Extra-
dition 136 and the 1966 Legal Principles Governing the Treatment of
Refugees Adopted by the Asian-African Legal Consultative Meeting in
Bangkok,137 Goodwin-Gill mentions the Refugee Convention. However,
the incorporation of any principle into a treaty or agreement per se is
insufficient to translate the principle into a general rule of customary
international law.
Elements necessary for the formation of a general rule of customary
international law were underpinned by the International Court of Justice
in North Sea Continental Shef Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark;
Republic of Germany v. The Netherlands). 138 The court argued that state practice
133 Robert Goldman and Scott Martin, 'International Legal Standards Relating to the Rights of
Aliens and Refugees and United States Immigration Law', (1983) 5 HRQ302, 315.
134 Ibid.
135 Guy Goodwin-Gill, International Law and the Movement of Persons Between States (Clarendon Press:
Oxford, 1978), 141. See also Guy Goodwin-Gill, 'Non-Refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers',
(1985-1986) 26 Virginia Journal of International Law 897, 901-903.
136 Article 3 of the European Convention on Extradition 359 UNTS 273 (Done at Paris, 13 Dec.
1957).
137 Article 3, Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, 'Principles Concerning Treatment of
Refugees', adopted in Bangkok 8-17 Aug. 1966.
1 41 ILR 29.
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may give rise to customary international law if it fulfils certain criteria: the
practice must be consistent, widely accepted and regarded as obligatory by
states. 139 Notably, these authors identify the correct criteria that a particu-
lar practice must meet in order to be accepted as customary international
law. However, the claim that by the 1980s the principle of non-refoulement
had attained customary international law status is questionable, as it is not
supported by any evidence of 'widespread authoritative' state practice.
Failure to follow through their thesis makes the position taken by Goldman
and Martin, as well as Goodwin-Gill, doubtful.
Authors like Grahl-Madsen and Hailbronner challenge the conclusion
arrived at by Goldman and Martin, as well as Goodwin-Gill. Grahl-
Madsen, for example, notes that although by 1980 domestic legislation
prohibited certain states from refouling refugees 'and there were a record of
some court decisions pointing to the same direction', this was by itself
insufficient to constitute 'a basis for contending that the principle of
non-refoulement had become a 'generally accepted principle'. 1 4 0 In an elabo-
rate survey of asylum law and practice of Western European and North
American states, published in 1986, Hailbronner demonstrates that state
practice did not support the claim that non-refoulement had crystallized into
a norm of customary international law. Rather, as the title of his article,
'Non-Refoulement and "Humanitarian" Refugees: Customary International
Law or Wishful Thinking', suggests, this principle as customary interna-
tional law was 'more properly viewed as the product of wishful thinking'. 141
Although Grahl-Madsen and Hailbronner fail to discuss the practice in
other parts of the world, such as Africa and Asia, their perspective, which
is supported by hard evidence, is more persuasive than the view taken
by Goldman and Martin, as well as Goodwin-Gill.
6. Collapse of Nairobi's refugee protection regime
Kenya is one of the few African states that has enjoyed peace and po-
litical stability since independence. This explains, to a certain extent, why
it has over the years attracted forced migrants from neighbouring and
nearby states. Unfortunately, the early protection regime could not sur-
vive the pressures of political events, the declining Kenyan economy and
the rising xenophobia towards forced migrants.
139 According to the International Court of Justice: 'Within the period in question ... state practice,
including that of states whose interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and
virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked; - and should moreover have occurred in such
a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved' (at 72).
14'0 Atle Grahl-Madsen, TerritorialAsylum (Stockholm, Almqvist and Wrksell: 1980), 41.
141 Kay Hailbronner, 'Non-Refoulement and "Humanitarian" Refugees: Customary International
Law or Wishful Thinking?', (1985-1986) 26 Virginia Journal of International Law 857, 858.
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6.1 Surge in asylum claims
After Siad Barre's regime in Somalia was ousted in January 1991, the
victorious forces were unable to fill the leadership vacuum, resulting in
turmoil, factional fighting and anarchy. From 1991, there was a mass
population movement from Somalia, with many refugees seeking to enter
Kenya through the border towns of Liboi and Amuma. In Kenya's mi-
gration history, this was the first time the country had experienced a
population movement of this magnitude. Subsequently, the Government
could neither determine nor regulate the number of asylum seekers en-
tering its territory. By the end of 1992, Kenya hosted almost 300,000
refugee claimants from Somalia. 142 Similarly, in Ethiopia, like in Somalia,
the internal conflict that ensued after the overthrow of President Mengistu
Mariam on 28 May 1991 caused a mass influx of refugee claimants into
Kenya. By 1992, Kenya hosted almost 70,000 Ethiopian asylum seek-
ers. 143 In contrast to the Somali and Ethiopian experiences, political in-
stability in Sudan was not caused by a military coup. Rather, Sudan had
a long history of civil war and internal strife since 1983, which set in
opposition the Arab-Muslims against the African-Christians. Whilst many
Sudanese nationals had fled to the Democratic Republic of Congo, 144
by 1992 some 22,000 Sudanese nationals had sought sanctuary in
Kenya. 145
Table 1
Nationality of Refugees Residing in Kenya by the End of 1992146







In summary, by 1991 Kenya, which had previously hosted some 15,000
refugees, was playing host to some 130,000 refugees - an increment of
more than eight fold. Just over a year later this figure had shot to almost
400,000.147 Collectively, events in neighbouring states sent shock waves
142 See UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2001: Refugees, Asylum-Seekers and Other Persons of Concern-Trends in
Displacement, Protection and Solutions, available on the UNHCR website at http://www.unhcr.ch (visited
12July 2003), 14.
143 Ibid., Annex A.7.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Data from UNHCR, above n. 142
147 Ibid., Annex A.4.
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through the asylum system. Ultimately, it became impossible to process
claims individually. The system worked whilst numbers were small and
manageable 48 but the sudden upsurge in numbers caught the Eligibility
Committee totally unawares. What resulted was a refugee assessment sys-
tem, designed to process a handful of asylum seekers at any one time, mak-
ing frantic attempts to process the mass influx of claims. The authorities
quickly realized that any attempts to process claims individually might
overwhelm the entire asylum regime. A practical solution lay in hiring
more personnel but, even then, the sheer weight of numbers made this
impractical and ultimately impossible. Eventually, Kenya was unable to
meet the cost of the deluge of claims and, not surprisingly, its population
grew weary to the point of xenophobia towards the fleeing hordes of
asylum seekers.
6.2 Declining economy
In 1993, the World Bank published a report describing the declining state
of the economy in Kenya:
The Kenyan economy is at a crossroads. Hailed for many years as a success story
in Sub-Saharan Africa, the economy in the past three years has begun to decline
and to exhibit features characteristic of the troubled economies of the region.
Growth has slowed from an average of 5 percent in 1986-90 to an average of 3.8
percent in 1988-1991. In fact the growth rate has fallen every year since 1989,
hitting 2.2 percent in 1991 and possibly turning negative in 1992 .... When the
economy was growing at a 5 percent a year, only about 48,000 wage-paying jobs
were created annually, against an annual increase in the labour force of almost
400,000 most of whom were educated and aspiring to wage-paying jobs. Today,
the unemployment rate in urban areas is at least 20 percent and the average real
wage is 45 percent of its level in 1980.149
The International Monetary Fund ('IMF') and World Bank structural
adjustment programs, or conditions that were imposed before resumption
of aid to Kenya from 1991, aggravated this decline. Overall, these condi-
tions caused a drastic reduction in cash flow to Kenya's economy, thus
forcing the Government to explore alternative sources of funds in order
to finance its budget deficit. These fiscal pressures meant that Nairobi
could ill afford to hire extra staff to process the additional asylum claims.
This, in turn, curtailed the entire refugee protection system.
148 Christiane Berthiaume, 'Kenya: The Birth of a Crisis', 1992 (89) Rfugees 26, describes it as a
'tidy programme with few problems', 26.
149 The World Bank, 'Kenya: Employment Growth for Poverty Alleviation, 14 May 1993', available
on the World Bank website at http://www.worldbank.org (visited 24 Apr. 2003).
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6.3 Xenophobic and anti-refugee attitudes
The weakened state of Kenya's economy and the mass influx of asylum
seekers were not the only contributing factors to the collapse of the Gov-
ernment's administrative programme. Other factors included growing
xenophobic and anti-refugee attitudes together with outright intolerance
of asylum seekers. In Government circles, these attitudes can be traced
to 1979 when President Idi Amin of Uganda was deposed. While con-
tributing to a debate in Parliament, which focused on rising crime in
Kenya, the then Minister of Health, The HonourableJohn Osogo, called
on the police force 'to mount more efforts in dealing with criminals'. He
claimed:
Many Ugandans who were offered the privilege of staying in Kenya as refugees
should now be collected and sent home. All should go back, ... Ugandan cars
being driven around in Nairobi should be held and ordered back. Whether lectur-
ers at the University or medical doctors practising in Kenya, they should all be
sent back to their homes. 150
Anti-refugee discourse developed gradually, reaching unprecedented
heights in 1993. The Manchester Guardian Weekly attributed the growth in
xenophobia to the 'number of Somalis in Kenyan towns and the fact that
Somali refugees get food aid while Kenyans have to cope with soaring
food prices because of recurrent drought'. 15 1 Sadly, not even the custom-
ary African 'open door, open heart' policy could salvage the situation. In
January 1993, citing security fears, the Kenyan Government requested
that the United Nations help repatriate all refugees 'because of banditry
and the strain on the country's resources'. 15 2 This decision, however, was
later rescinded. These reactions support the argument that the African
principle of hospitality is inevitably diluted as states receive asylum seek-
ers beyond their resource-capacity.
For these reasons, as a Kenyan Government Official in charge of Refu-
gee Affairs explained:
After 1990, the [Kenyan] Government pulled out [of the refugee status deter-
mination process] and gave UNHCR mandate [owing to] the sheer numbers
of asylum seekers [which] at one time had reached 450,000. It was not easy
admit them individually. 153
The mass influx led to the suspension of the Eligibility Committee as it
was impractical to assess asylum claims on an individual basis.
150 Associated Press, 'Kenyan Call For Repatriation of Ugandan Refugees', 27July 1979, available
on the LexisNexis website at http://www.lexisnexis.com.au (visited 27June 2001).
151 Ibid.
152 'Cash-strapped Kenya Asks UN to Send Home Refugees', Manchester Guardian Weekly 31 Jan.
1993, available on the LexisNexis website at http://www.lexisnexis.com.au (visited 27June 2001).
153 Interview with Government of Kenya Official, Nairobi, 3 Mar. 2003.
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6.4 Introduction of prima facie procedures and encampment
policy into the asylum landscape
Following this mass influx, UNHCR requested that Kenya, for practical
reasons, grant asylum seekers refugee status on a prima facie basis. This
system of refugee claim assessment is a tool of preliminary decision-
making that arose out of necessity and practice. It was established to
grant provisional status and protection to large groups of asylum seekers
who could not be processed using individual status determination proce-
dures. The UNHCR request to Kenya was initially turned down. The
Kenyan Government may have initially interpreted this request to mean
that all asylum seekers would be admitted and granted uncontrolled
movement rights, particularly those later granted full mandate. Sur-
rounded by civil strife and internal confrontation, Nairobi's main concern
was the exportation of the armed conflict from neighbouring states into
the country. Moreover, there was also a risk of the general security in
Kenya degenerating if the movement of asylum seekers was left unchecked.
A 1990 Human Rights Watch Report on Kenya captures this fear:
On October 16, President Moi announced that all Rwandese refugees would have
to leave the country. He claimed that Rwandese refugees were using Kenya as
a base for subversive activities - a direct reference to the October invasion of
Rwanda by rebels based in Uganda. On October 22, he extended the order to
Ugandan refugees.154
It is apparent, therefore, that security is a key concern in the making of
a state's asylum policy Indeed, this factor may, in turn, lead a host state
to adopt measures that seek to restrain the movement of refugees and
asylum seekers.
Aside from the Eligibility Committee, the Thika Reception Centre,
which was originally designed to house a maximum of 500 persons, was
also overwhelmed by the sudden mass influx. The Reception Centre was
incapable of holding the new arrivals. Nonetheless, a solution had to be
found in order to ameliorate the suffering asylum seekers might endure.
The Government's wish to limit the movement of and the need for extra
space to accommodate asylum seekers and refugees may explain the
establishment of refugee camps in Kenya. Some observers contend, how-
ever, that the Kenyan policy might have been primarily driven by security
concerns rather than issues relating to space. In a commentary that
explores the reasons why host states prefer forcing refugees into camps,
Richard Black, for example, asserts that the prime consideration for
applying this measure is 'likely to be the political and security implica-
tions of the pattern of refugee settlements' rather than other questions,
154 Human Rights Watch, 'Kenya: Human Rights Developments', available on Human Rights
Watch website at http://www.hrw.org (visited 29 Apr. 2003).
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such as those relating to 'accessibility, efficiency and transparency of aid
delivery'. 155
As regards determination of claims, it is important to realise that sus-
pension of the Eligibility Committee meant that thousands of asylum
seekers would remain in limbo. To avoid this, UNHCR stepped in to seal
the protection gap, thus transforming its mandate from passive to active.
As some suggest, the UNHCR found itself in the inevitable position of
having compromised its role as the protector of refugees by becoming the
'prosecutor' and 'adjudicator' 156 of who is considered to be a refugee.
By the end of 2006, Kenya's refugee protection regime fell largely on
the UNHCR.
7. What are the lessons learnt from history?
To what extent does Kenya's experience offer insights and perspectives
towards meeting the plight facing the hundreds of thousands who have
been forced to seek sanctuary outside of their home States? Seven lessons
can be learnt from the preceding analysis.
The first lesson relates to the definition of the term refugee, which,
according to Kenya's domestic law, refers to persons who have fled their
state of origin for reasons of persecution. This narrow definition is out of
touch with reality. Experience demonstrates that, in addition to persecu-
tion, Africans also flee their home states due to factors such as armed
conflict. To put it another way, refugee situations are a direct result of
human rights violations. This is demonstrated in the following accounts
by forced migrants explaining why they left their homes:
As refugees, we are victims of violence and war. We left our motherland because
we are being mistreated in many ways. We ran to get protection in other
countries. 157
In Togo, we were not at war, but we were in a war-like situation. When soldiers leave
their barracks and start to fire on defenceless people - women and children -
they realize that their safety is at stake and they start to flee. 158
Accordingly, it remains crucial for any asylum system, which is serious
about protecting those who have been forced to flee their home states, to
come to terms with this reality. Kenya's practical refugee scheme recog-
nised the basic factors that forced people to flee their home states in
155 Richard Black, 'Putting Refugees in Camps', (1998) 2 Forced Migration Review 4, 6.
156 Edwin Odhiambo-Abuya and George Wachira, 'Assessing Asylum Claims in Africa: Meeting or
Missing Standards?', (2006) 53 (2) Netherlands International Law Review 171, 201.
157 Mayak A, 'What is a Refugee?' in Naomi Flutter and Carl Solomon, (eds.), Tilting Cages: An
Anthology of Refigee Writings (Sydney: Naomi Flutter and Carl Solomon: 1995) 10-11.
158 Gabriel Dosseh, Togolese refugee in Ghana, quoted in Christiane Berthiaume, 'Togo: A Crisis
Like No Other', 1993 (93) Refutgees 24, 25.
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search of safety in the country. Subsequently, the reasons for seeking asy-
lum were expanded to cover the new refugee situations. Equally impor-
tant is the idea of granting complementary protection - persons unable
to qualify as refugees under the terms of the legislative system could be
protected if they were deemed 'refugees' by the practical regime.
The second lesson relates to the procedures for determining asylum
claims. The analysis in this article demonstrates the importance of syn-
chronising the legal and practical protection systems in order to clearly
identify the proper Government officials responsible for assessing refugee
claims. Further, the need to stipulate the qualifications of officials engaged
in claim processing, expeditious assessment of refugee applications and the
role of domestic as well as international actors, including the UNHCR,
has also been underlined. Legal history suggests that other residual proce-
dural questions, such as, for example, those relating to appeals, excluded
asylum seekers and the cessation of status also need to be clearly spelt out
by law. Otherwise, the failure to address these issues is bound to create
conflict at operational level, which sometimes could be to the detriment
of those whom the system is designed to protect.
In addition, these findings also highlight the value of having adequate
resources for border control and assessment of claims. Many African states,
unlike their westernised counterparts, lack adequate resources to feed their
nationals, let alone for border control. 15 9 Yet in order to run an effective
refugee protection regime, a solid financial base is a pre-requisite. Other-
wise, there is the potential risk that thousands of asylum seekers would
remain without surrogate protection. James Elgass makes this point in a
commentary on the early United States migration scheme. He asserts that
'without federal assurances [of full financial support], states would be una-
ble to plan their refugee resettlement programs efficiently'. 160 Therefore,
efforts to improve the refugee protection regime must take into account the
economic realities in Africa. Unless this reality is embraced, African states
may find themselves, like some of their westernised counterparts, trying to
legislate to keep out asylum seekers and refugees, 16 1 or asking for the refu-
gee treaties to be rewritten. 162 Some critics would argue that in situations
159 The author has canvassed this issue in a separate article. See Edwin Odhiambo-Abuya, 'Revisit-
ing Liberalism and Post-Colonial Theory in the Context of Asylum Applications', (2006) 24 Netherlands
Qyarterly of Human Rights 193, 209-211.
160 James Elgass, 'Federal Funding of United States Refugee Resettlement Before and After the
Refugee Act of 1990', (1982) 3 Michgan YearBook of International Law 179, 191.
16' For a discussion of this practise, see E. Odhiambo-Abuya, 'Refugee Status Determination in
Australia: Breaking the Rules?', (2004) 25 Liverpool Law Review 221, 229-235.
162 See Mary Crock, 'The Refugee Convention at 50: Mid-life Crisis or Terminal Inadequacy?
An Australian Perspective', in Susan Kneebone (ed.), The Refugee Convention 50 Years On (Hants:
Ashgate, 2003) 47-89, 52, writing, 'In early 2001, the [Australian] Coalition government through the
Minister of Immigration, Phillip Ruddock, floated the idea of rewriting the [Refugee] Convention,
arguing that the instrument is ill suited to modern-day experiences of refugee movements'. See also
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where an asylum system is under considerable pressure the African norm
of hospitality could salvage the situation. However, in conditions where
asylum states are stretched to the limit the level of protection offered is
likely to decline as the findings of this piece demonstrate.
Asylum is not about allowing refugees entry into the territory of a host
state or offering physical space to house those who have been forced to flee
their home states. Rather, the focus should be on meeting the needs of
those who claim not to have recourse to protection from their home coun-
tries. In the context of protection outcomes, it is important for asylum
systems to recognize the porosity of African borders and then to try to
amalgamate the international asylum system with the African custom of
hospitality. Further, if a humanitarian approach is favoured, host states
would need to undertake practical measures to accord refugees, at the very
least, internationally recognised entitlements such as rights to work, educa-
tion, vocational training and family reunion, as well as freedom of move-
ment. However, these attempts must not overlook the historical protection
system. Access to these entitlements is crucial for supporting the rights and
capacities of refugees to develop life skills and become self-sufficient. As
was noted at the drafting of the Refugee Convention, the aim of social and
economic assistance should be to enable refugees to assimilate into the
new society and become self-reliant:
International agreements on refugees and stateless persons should be aimed at
assisting the refugee to build up an economically independent existence as quickly
as possible, and to enable [a person] to acquire sources of income so that he
[or she] will not be a public charge. 163
Implementation requires removal of the barriers that deny refugees en-
joyment of these entitlements.
Historical experience also demonstrates that joint endeavours in African
states, partly by the Government and partly by UNHCR, churches and aid
agencies, significantly contribute towards the granting of refugee entitle-
ments prescribed by the international human rights framework and refu-
gee law. Even so, the level of protection stands to be severely undermined
by sudden rises in the number of persons in need of succour and dimin-
ished financial capacity on the part of service providers, as well as the
porosity of African borders. Even though, in the case of Kenya, the
UNHCR subsequently filled the protection space left by Nairobi, two
Anthony Richmond, 'Globalization: Implications for Immigrants and Refugees', (2002) 25 Ethnic
and Racial Studies 707 claiming that the Refugee Convention 'is anachronistic and needs to be
replaced', 718.
163 United Nations General Assembly, 'Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees
and Stateless Persons: Proposals Concerning the Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees',
statement submitted by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, a non-governmental
organization in consultative relationship with the Economic and Social Council, A/CONF.2/NGO.5
(6July 1951).
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points need to be emphasised. Firstly, in the refugee protection equation
the active participation of the host state remains imperative. In addition, a
stable financial base is crucial if persons who flee their home states are to
be protected based on internationally accepted standards. Otherwise,
when these two ingredients are absent, it is difficult to see how any agency
or Government that assumes responsibility can ameliorate the suffering of
forced migrants. Put simply, it is insufficient to have merely a will to render
humanitarian assistance; equally important is a way of ensuring that the
support reaches the persons targeted. The events leading up to the suspen-
sion of Kenya's Eligibility Committee demonstrate that that refugee
policies in the developing world are largely influenced by the economic
capability of the host country to take in forced migrants.
Furthermore, the history of asylum underpins the importance of pro-
viding reasons for any refugee application (the right to reasons is expressed
in the maxim: nullum arbitrium sine rationibis). The main concern in this
regard relates to the points that a rejected claimant might advance in order
to support his or her appeal. As was noted above, the right to appeal is
severely hampered when decision-makers fail to provide reasons for their
decisions. The practise of giving reasons for a decision promotes one of
the fundamental requirements of due process, namely, the right to be
heard1 64 (expressed in the maxim: audi alterampartem). If a system can afford
appeals, it must provide reasons for adverse decisions to make the appeals
meaningful.
The yardstick for determining whether an outcome in law satisfies the
requirements of a decision is whether the reasons demonstrate clearly that
an adjudicator has applied legal principles to the adduced evidence.Justice
Keith of the New Zealand Court of Appeal emphasized in Singh v. Chief
Executive Officer Department of Labour16 5 that a statement of reasons should
contain the following: 16 6
(a) Findings on material questions of fact;
(b) a reference to the relevant law or legal principles;
(c) the application of the law as determined to the facts as found.
Therefore, in order to qualify as a decision, an outcome must be accom-
panied by detailed reasons. However, as the European Court of Human
Rights observed in Van de Hurk v. The Netherlands, the obligation to provide
reasons should not be interpreted 'as requiring a detailed answer to every
argument'. 16 7 Rather, to borrow from common law jurisprudence, the test
164 Articles 14 and 10 of the ICCPR and UDHR, respectively.
165 (1999) New Zealand Administrative Reports 258.
166 Ibid., 263.
167 (1994) 18 EHRR 481, 502. Note that art. 45 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
4 Nov. 1950, 213 UNTS 222 (entered into force 3 Sept. 1953) requires reasons to be given for
judgements and decisions.
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is whether a reasonable person is able to understand the statement of rea-
sons to enable him or her to exercise any appeal or review rights. In R v.
Civil Service Appeal Board, ex parte Cunningham, for example, Lord Donaldson
underscored that 'fairness requires a tribunal ... to give sufficient reasons
for its decision to enable parties to know the issues to which it addressed its
mind and that it acted lawfully'. 168 In summary, the statement that officials
in Kenya used to communicate its asylum decisions fell short of satisfying
the requirements of such a decision. Commentators 169 and case law1 70
have underpinned that the giving of reasons is beneficial on the following
grounds:
" Provision of reasons is likely to provide an assurance that a decision
has been well thought through rather than arbitrarily handed down
by an agency.
" An obligation to give reasons may encourage public confidence in the
decision-making process.
" Where a system provides for appeals or review, reasons facilitate this
process as they enable an aggrieved party to know why an application
was rejected and indicate whether any grounds for appeals or review
exist.
" Reasoned opinions promote the principles of natural justice and the
duty to accord fairness in decision making.
• Giving of reasons promotes good administration.
Thus, asylum states should adopt policies that incorporate inclusion of
reasons for their decisions.
Moreover, if refugee host states in Africa, in particular, are genuinely
committed to ameliorating the plight of victims of war and/or persecu-
tion, they must undertake practical measures to promote the rights of peo-
ple who plainly need assistance. The fundamental question is who gains
protection? The international refugee treaties, namely the Refugee Con-
vention and the OAU Refugee Convention, may act as a guide. To pro-
mote the entitlements due to refugees, states must aim at designing asylum
systems that grant refugees and asylum seekers the widest possible human
rights as affirmed in the UDHR, international refugee laws and the in-
ternational human rights framework. To this end, the claim assessment
168 (1991) 4 All ER 310, 320.
169 Robert Fisher, 'Improving Tribunal Decisions and Reasons', (2003) New Zealand Law Review 517;
Geoffrey Flick, 'Administrative Adjudications and the Duty to Give Reasons - A Search for Criteria',
(1978) Public Law 16; Lord Woolf, JeffreyJowell and A.T Le Sueur, Principles of Juadicial Review (London:
Sweet and Maxwell, 1999), 341-360; William Wade, Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000), 516-520.
170 Magy Donaldson u Board of Education of the City of North Windwood 65 NJ 236; Osmond v. Public
Service Board of New South Wales (1984) 3 NSWLR 447; Hugh Jordan v. UK (2003) 37 EHRR 2; Manis
Baker v. (Canada) Minister of Cit.zenship and Immigration (1999) 2 SCR 817.
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process must be geared towards applying group determination procedures,
for those fleeing from situations of generalised violence and disorder, and
individual procedures for those who are excluded from the former catego-
rization. The refugee determination system should also provide for the
rights of appeal, or judicial review of decisions, to ensure that the process
is independent and conforms to the basic due process guarantees. More
emphasis must also be placed on humanitarian aid and security checks to
ensure that only genuine asylum seekers are admitted. Overall, these meas-
ures have the potential to benefit asylum seekers and refugees, as well as
host Governments.
An issue which this article does not address in detail, but which is none-
theless important to the discourse of forced migration, is the role of con-
flict prevention, management and resolution, which go to the root causes
of migration flows. One African adage advises: 'if you want to climb a
tree, start at the bottom'. Few would deny that focussing on the root causes,
rather than the tragic symptoms, is by far the most effective way of address-
ing the plight facing those forced to flee their home states. Ongoing situa-
tions of armed conflict and civil strife in many parts of the world remain a
major obstacle to the repatriation of refugees. As previously cautioned,
one must start at the bottom. An approach, which involves evaluating the
causes that generate refugees, so as to prevent and or contain the influx at
the outset, should be adopted. Failure to do so could cause dire conse-
quences, particularly to displaced persons. Accordingly, mediators in any
peace talks must strive to sustain the process to its logical conclusion. They
should aim at ensuring warring parties agree to a permanent ceasefire.
These kinds of efforts are a reminder that, in order to find a permanent
solution to the plight of asylum seekers and refugees, more is needed than
merely formal protection systems. 171 A recent example in Africa is the
peace plan struck in May 2004 between rebels and the Sudanese Govern-
ment 172 following sustained talks hosted by Kenya under the auspices
of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. This pact was ex-
pected to pave the way for the return of some 600,000 Sudanese refu-
gees currently residing in six African countries. 173 However, the ongoing
humanitarian disaster in Darfur, which displaced close to one million
171 E. Odhiambo Abuya, 'Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: Examining Overlapping
Institutional Mandates of the International Committee of the Red Cross and United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees', (2003) 7 Singapore journal of International and Comparative Law 236, 266.
172 Charles Omondi, 'Sudan Pact to Benefit Kenya', The Daily Nation 2 June 2004, available on the
website of the Daily Nation (visited 2 June 2004); Henry Owuor, 'New Deal Makes Sudan Peace
Dream True', The Daily Nation 28 May 2004, available on the website of the Daily Nation (visited 28
May 2004). All of the Daily Nation articles mentioned in this article are available on the website of the
Daily Nation at: http://www.nationmedia.com.
173 Source of data: UNHCR, '2004 Global Refugee Trends', available on the website of the
UNHCR, (visited 17 May 2006), Table 4.
HeinOnline  -- 19 Int'l J. Refugee L. 93 2007
94 Edwin Odhiambo Abuya
people, 174 remains a major obstacle. Moreover, Khartoum's suspected
involvement has aggravated the situation.
The need to invest in long-term projects that address peace building and
maintenance initiatives is greater in the current climate. Considering that
we are now living in a world of terrorism, where fear of the 'other' and
threats of war and insecurity are now more imminent than before, it is
likely that many host states will continue to deny entry and support to even
the most genuine of cases.1 75 Since September 2001, and the subsequent
global fight against terrorism, asylum seekers have been reclassified as
potential terrorists. Further, in order to address their vulnerabilities to ter-
rorism, many governments have tightened their migration and visa regimes.
For example, Adel A1-Dahas, an Iraqi asylum seeker, languished in a
Kenyan jail for five years (2001 to 2006) because all countries that had
been approached to resettle him refused for fear that he could be a security
threat. 17 6 This claim seems to have stemmed from the fact that he worked
as an Air Force Engineer during the reign of the late Saddam Hussein. 177
8. Conclusion: the challenge ahead - further research
Using Kenya as a case study, this article has considered the interaction
between the asylum legislative framework and its practical application
within a particular African setting. As this analysis shows, there is a con-
siderable distance between the law in the statute books and its operation
on the ground. A review of the early refugee protection regime seems to
suggest that what African states, which adopted laws and regulations from
the colonial powers, need is new refugee-specific legislation to address
their predicament rather than a simple revision of old laws. Tanzania
and South Africa have led the way in this regard. 178
Generally speaking, the evolution of Kenya's asylum protection system
demonstrates the challenges African states faced, and continue to face, in
their quest to offer sanctuary to those seeking asylum. Historical accounts
provide insights and perspectives on the current refugee protection dis-
course. Accordingly, it is hoped that the points highlighted in this article
will challenge and inspire commentators on Africa, and elsewhere, to
174 UNHCR, 'Chad/Sudan: Director of Operations Visits Ahead of Increased UNHCR Darfur
Presence', available on the UNHCR website (visited 18 Aug. 2004).
175 There is considerable evidence to support this argument, see: Mai Kaneko, 'Beyond "Seclusion-
ist"Japan: Evaluating the Free Aghans/Refugee Law Reform Campaign after September 11', (2003)
21 RefAge 34; Evelien Brouwer, 'Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism: A Changing Dynamic Legal and
Practical Developments in the EU Response to the Terrorist Attacks of 11.09', (2003) 4 European Journal
of Miration and the Law 399; Michel Coutu and Marie-Hlne Giroux, 'The Aftermath of 11 Septem-
ber 2001: Liberty v. Security before the Supreme Court of Canada', (2006) 18 IJLR 313.
176 Stephen Muiruri, 'Dilemma Over Terror Suspect', The Daily Nation 17 Aug. 2004, available on
the Daily Nation website (visited 18 Aug. 2004).
177 Ibid.
178 See above n. 27.
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undertake similar studies that probe the evolution of refugee protection
within specific settings. Data generated from these studies will not only
bridge the current literature gap but the research findings will go a long
way towards offering best practise lessons for those involved in refugee
protection. Perhaps, through such scholarship, a way forward might be
found to meet the plight facing approximately 21 million persons of con-
cern worldwide. 179 For if we ignore the lessons of history (or advice of
mkuu)180 do we not risk repeating the same mistakes?
' UNHCR, above n. 12, 2.
180 See above n. 1.
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